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Abstract 
Bioterrorism has become a greater concern for Americans 
since the 2001 anthrar: letters. Recent studies have explored the 
possibilities of biological attacks, and most deal with possible 
large-scale attacks. However, there is reason to believe that 
small-scale attacks are more likely. Even though there have 
been investigations of the postal delivery system and the spread 
ofbioagents through mail, few if any studies have looked at 
an attack on a single building and the resultant spread from 
room to room. One particular method of attacking a building 
would be a single-event release of an aerosol bioagent in the 
building. This paper describes the development of a method 
for stud_ving the spread of an aerosol throughout a building in 
order to determine what factors most affect the time between 
release and the lethal exposure for an occupant in various 
locations. A multi-zone airflow model, CONTAM, was used to 
simulate and compare the effects of the air handling system 
operation, door position, building level, predominant wind 
direction, and other factors. It was found that the air handling 
system, building floor level, and door position changed the 
time to lethal exposure. For the scenarios investigated, lethal 
exposure times rangedfrom 5 seconds to nearly 15 minutes, 
and the air handling system was found to have the greatest 
effect on a contaminants spread through a building. 
Introduction 
Throughout history, biological weapons have been used to 
wage war. One of the earliest and possibly deadliest examples 
occurred in the mid-1300s in Kaffa as bubonic plague victims 
of the Tartar army were catapulted over the city walls. Some 
believe that this is what led to the epidemic throughout 
medieval Europe that killed 25 million. The twentieth century 
saw the rise of research into biowarfare among nations across 
the world. This led to the signing of the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention, which forbids research with oflensive 
biological agents and stockpiling bioweapons for military 
purposes [ 1]. 
Bioterrorism has become a concern for everyday 
Americans following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Center. The first incidents involving anthrax 
occurred on September 25, 200 I, when an assistant to Tom 
Brokaw (NBC anchorman) began to develop cutaneous 
anthrax after handling a letter containing anthrax powder. By 
November 2, 200 I, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) had 
reported 21 cases of anthrax -16 confirmed and 5 suspected 
[2]. Anthrax is classified as a Category A bioterrorism agent. 
There are three categories of possible bioterrorist diseases 
or agents. Category A Diseases/ Agents are the highest 
priority risks. These agents are the worst because they can be 
transmitted easily, result in high mortality rates, have potential 
for major public health impacts, and require special action for 
public health preparedness. Currently there are six listed by 
the CDC in Category A: Anthrax, Botulism, Plague, Smallpox, 
Tularemia, and Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers. Category B 
Diseases/ Agents are moderately easy to disseminate, have low 
mortality rates, and require enhanced disease surveillance by 
the CDC. Category C Diseases/ Agents are those considered to 
be available for mass dissemination, are easily produced, and 
have potential for high mortality rates. [3) 
A large-scale release into the atmosphere or over a large 
city is greatly feared. For example, the release of I 00 kg of 
anthrax over a large city could kill millions [4]. Large-scale 
attacks have been attempted by terrorists in the past, but all 
have failed. For instance, the Japanese doomsday cult Aum 
Shinrikyo failed on ten separate occasions at an open-air urban 
attack of anthrax or botulism, despite having considerable 
wealth and scientific capabilities. In March of 1995, the cult 
eventually killed 12 people through the release of sarin nerve 
gas in a Tokyo subway. Experts believe that in the near term, it 
is considered more likely that terrorist attacks will be small-
scale attempts or merely hoaxes. [5] 
Problem Statement 
The misuse of a building's ventilation system to spread 
a biological agent throughout a building is a real possibility 
[6]. The purpose of this study was to simulate various small-
scale attack scenarios on a typical 'office' building. The time 
between bioagent release and the time at which an occupant is 
exposed to a lethal dose were compared for various scenarios. 
In addition, the importance of building related factors such 
as air handling system (AHS) operation, building floor level, 
door position (open or closed), and predominant wind direction 
were analyzed. 
ll.fodeling 1Uethod 
The use of airflow model techniques was determined to 
be the best approach for this undergraduate research project. 
I Dr. Darin Nutter will be the corresponding author. Mr. Andrew Cantrell is currently an officer in the U.S. Navy, Nuclear Propulsion Program. 1
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The National Institute of Science and Technology developed 
and maintains a model that was originally designed to analyze 
building ventilation and indoor air quality issues. This 
computer simulation model is known as CONTAM and is a 
multizone airflow and contaminant transport model capable 
of determining zonal airflows, contaminant concentrations, 
and personal exposures rates [7]. Using CONTAM to 
evaluate potential building terrorism is a logical extension 
of its application. It has more recently been considered an 
appropriate tool for such building simulations [8-11]. Other 
published works [12-14], only somewhat related, are recent 
studies on exposure to passengers, airflow and pathogen 
transport within aircraft cabins. 
For this study, a simple building was sketched to model 
several different scenarios. The building is two stories tall 
with both floors having a large open space in the center that is 
meant to represent a cubicle area. On each floor and along the 
two opposite sides, are smaller rooms representing individual 
offices. In Figure I, the CONTAM sketches for each floor are 
shown. CONTAM inputs included sizes for walls, ducts, and 
airflow paths (windows, doors, wall leakages, cracks, etc.). 
Mechanical systems such as ducts, fans, and zone sizes are also 
inputs. In addition, information on the tracked contaminants 
(i.e., biological agents) 
was input along with 
the location and 
method of entering the 
building. 
Depending on 
were based on an inhalation rate of20 m3/day [15, 16] and a 
mean lethal dose (LD50) ofO.Ol micrograms. The LD50 value 
chosen was calculated for Inhalation Anthrax from the low end 
of the University of Alabama, Birmingham's LD50 estimate 
of a 10,000-20,000 spores [16] and Ed Lake's concentration 
estimate of one trillion spores per gram [17]. For the 
calculations, a I% solution was assumed for the aerosol device, 
so the times until lethal exposure were based on l microgram 
of aerosol exposure. 
Results and Discussion 
Lethal Exposure Time:s 
Table I contains the resulting times until lethal exposure 
(LD50) for each of the 16 simulations. The table is organized 
based on where the contaminant was released (office or 
maintenance), where exposure was calculated for an occupant 
(lst floor office, etc.) and whether the doors in the building 
were open or closed. The data are listed in minute:second (mm: 
ss) format. 
For each room, the contaminant level and exposure level 
had similarly shaped curves as functions of time. Figures 
2a-b are representative: Figure 2a is for the scenario in which 
the biocontaminant originated in a lst floor office and all 
doors were open with 
the scenario, a burst 
contaminant source 
was placed in either First Floor Second Floor 
exposure measured in 
the 1st floor cubicle 
area. Figure 2b displays 
similar conditions 
except the contaminant 
originates in the l st 
floor maintenance 
room. Note that the 
a I st floor office 
(location A) or a 1st 
floor maintenance 
Figure I. CONTAM two-story office building sketch with indicated release (A: I st floor 
office and B: I st floor maintenance room) and exposure (I: I st floor office, 2: 2nd floor graphs are given over a 
office, 3: 1st floor cubical area. and 4: 2nd floor cubical area) locations.CONTAM much larger time range 
room (location B). The source considered was an aerosol burst 
of0.4 kg contaminant into the model at 10:00 AM. Simulations 
were run with doors in the building either all open or all closed. 
Exposure results were calculated in 1st and 2nd floor offices 
(locations 1-2) and in 1st and 2nd floor cubicle areas (locations 
3-4), resulting 
than the time required to lethal exposure. 
Building Factors: 
The effect of the AHS can be seen by comparing exposure 
times between scenarios with the contaminant originating 
in the maintenance room (with no ventilation) and the office 
in a total of 16 Table l. Time to lethal Exposure (mm:ss) 
(having ventilation). For 
an exposure in the same 
room, it would take 5 to 
14 times as long for a 
lethal dose to be reached 
when the contaminant 
Exposure Location 
simulated scenarios. 
The burst source is 
representative of 
1((0:~o~~~ 1 Floor Cubicles 2 Floor Office 2''' (;Iocr Cub~~les (location 3) {location 2\ Location 4 
an aerosol release 











full air-conditioning ventilation and return; in contrast, the 
maintenance room has no air-conditioning ventilation or return. 
CONTAM exports results for simulated bioagent 
concentrations for every zone at each time step. Five second 
increments were chosen as the time step for these simulations 
and found generally to capture the lethal exposure time 
scale. To determine exposure for a person in each room, a 
spreadsheet was used to integrate the data. These calculations 
Closed Ocen Closed Ocen Closed 
00:10 00:55 00:40 1:25 01:05 
00:55 08:35 08:05 12:35 14:45 
burst originated in the maintenance room as compared to the 
office. For contaminants originating in the office, the longest 
time to lethal exposure was l minute 25 seconds, occurring in 
the second floor cubical area with all doors open. No matter 
the scenario, a release in the office had some of the agent 
immediately dra>vn into the AHS and quickly distributed 
throughout the building. The worst maintenance room release 
case occurred with all doors open. The time to lethal exposure 
time was 45 seconds in the adjoining cubicle area. For most 2
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was due to the fact that some of the contaminant 
escaped through open office door (into the cubical 
area), leaving less to enter the AHS which supplies 
the rest of the building. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Figure 2a. Contaminant concentration and exposure le\el vs. time for l "1 floor office release to Is' floor cubicles 
Simulations for common elements of a two-
story office building computed times for occupant 
lethal exposure that ranged from a few seconds to 
just over 14 mmutes. Shorter times corresponded to 














Figure 2b. Contaminant concentration and exposure level vs. time for 1 ~~ floor maintenance release to I~~ floor 
cubicles exposure. 
rooms on floors different from the release pomt and 
when the contaminant was released from rooms 
without ventilation. The study shows the critical 
nature and importance of protecting against small-
scale bioterror attacks in buildings. This means that 
an increased ability to detect b10agents is needed. 
Sensing technologies must be developed to detect 
quickly various agents at low concentrations. In the 
event of a biological release in a building, it is clear 
that one operating strategy is to shut off AHS as 
soon as a threat is detected. 
Many effects that were not considered in 
maintenance release cases, however, several minutes passed 
before lethal exposure time was reached. This was because 
the contaminant would have to first exit the maintenance room 
before it could be spread through the building within the AHS. 
The AHS was the most dominant factor; however, the 
level (or floor) an occupant is on (relative to the contaminant 
release location) was also found to be important. The longest 
time until lethal exposure occurred when burst contaminant 
originated in the maintenance room. Of course, the longer 
the time to lethal exposure, the more opportunity to evacuate. 
If the biological release originated in an office, a person 
would become lethally exposed by simply traveling through 
the first floor cubicle area. When the release originated in 
the maintenance room, however, the contaminant level in 
the cubicles might be low enough for a period of time for 
occupants to leave the building. Further, it was expected that, 
with a contaminant originating on the first floor, the exposure 
times on a different floor would be nearly equal in each room. 
The second floor cubicle area consistently had longer exposure 
times than the second floor office room. This is suspected to 
be caused by unequal air circulation between the rooms. If one 
room has a higher air exchange rate, it would follow that the 
AHS would deliver a contaminant to that particular room at a 
higher rate as well. 
Having open or closed doors affected the outcome the 
least. In general, longer times to lethal exposure occurred with 
doors closed when the exposure concern was in the adjoining 
room to the release point. The same was true (all doors closed) 
in nearly every case where the contaminant originated in 
the maintenance room. When the contaminant originated in 
the office room, having the doors open was better in every 
exposure room excluding the adjoining cubicle area. This 
this study could be further studied with CONTAM. 
These include the effects of outside windows, shutting off an 
AHS after release of an agent, filters and filter efficiencies, 
multiple AHS within a building, etc. To be fully prepared for 
the type of bioterrorist attack examined in this study, a model 
of a specific building should be made, and multiple scenarios 
should be run for that particular building to determme what 
procedures will minimize the occupant's exposures. 
References 
l. "History of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism." Arizona 
Department of Public Health Services. http://www.azdhs. 
gov/phs/edc/edrp/es/bthistor2.htm. 
2. "History of Bioterrorism; A chronological History of 
Bioterrorism and Biowarfare Throughout the Ages." 
Biological Terrorism Response Manual. http://www. 
bioteny.com/HistorvBioTerr.html. 
3. "Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases (by Category)." Centers for 
Disease Control and Preparedness. http://www.bt.cdc. 
gov/agent/agentlist-categorv.asp. 
4. "Anthrax." NMS Bio-Defense. http://www.nmsbiodefense. 
com/hazards/bio anthrax.htm. 
5. Tucker, Jonathan B. "Historical Trends Related to 
Bioterrorism: An Empirical Analysis." Emerging 
Infectious Diseases. Volume 5. Number 4. Centers for 
Disease Control and Preparedness. http://www.cdc.gov/ 
ncidodleidlvol5no4/tucker.htm. 
6. Kowalski, W J. "Defending Buildings Against 
Bioterrorism." Engineered Systems. Oct 2002. pg 61-68. 
7. "NIST Multizone Modeling Website", National Institute of 
Science and Technology (Nrsn. <http://www.bfrl.nist. 
gov!IAQanalysis/index.htm>. 3
Cantrell: Factors Affecting the Spread of a Bioterrorist Agent Throughout
Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2008
26 INQ1JIRY Volume 9 2008 
8. Chen, Qingyan (Yan). "Protecting Buildings from Chemical 
and Biological Warfare Agent Attacks- A Long Journey." 
HVAC&R Research. Vol 10 No 4. Oct 2004. pg 389-391. 
9. Reshetin, Vladimir P. and James L. Regens. "Simulation 
Modeling of Anthrax Spore Dispersion in a Bioterrorism 
Incident." Risk Analysis. Vol. 23. 6 Nov 2003. pg 1135-
1145. 
I 0. Yeboah, F. E., eta!., "Protecting Buildings Against 
Bioterrorism- Review of Guidance and Tools", ASHRAE 
Transactions, DA-07-029, 2007, pg 263-272. 
II. Cheong, K. W. D., et a!., "Measurement and Computations 
of Contaminant's Distribution in an Office Environment", 
Building and Environment, Vol. 38,2003, pg 135-145. 
12. Lin, C. H., et al., "Numerical Simulation of Airflow and 
Airborne Pathogen Transport in Aircraft Cabins - Part 
1: Numerical Simulation of the Flow Field", ASHRAE 
Transactions, OR-05-8-4, 2005. 
13. Lin, C. H., et al., "Numerical Simulation of Airflow and 
Airborne Pathogen Transport in Aircraft Cabins- Part II: 
Numerical Simulation of Airborne Pathogen Transport", 
ASHRAE Transactions, OR-05-8-5, 2005. 
14. Naiping, G. and Jianlei, N., "Improvement of Facial 
Humidity and Reduction of Pollutant Inhalation 
in Commercial Aircraft Cabins via Application of 
Personalized Ventilation", ASHRAE Transactions, SL-08-
004, 2008. 
15. "Risk Assessment: Frequently Asked Questions." Mid-
Atlantic Risk Assessment. 7 Mar 2007. <http://www.epa. 
gov/reg3hwmd/risklhuman/info/faq.htm> 
16. "Anthrax Summary." AUB- Bioterrorism. Accessed 24 
Apr. 2007. <http://www.bioterrorism.uab.edu/CatagoryA/ 
Anthrax/summary.asp> 
17. Lake, Ed. "Were the Anthrax Spores Coated with Silica or 
Not?" 8 Dec 2003. rev. 17 Aug 2004. online. <http://www. 
anthraxinvestigation.corn!coatings.html> 
Mentor Comments: 
Dr. Darrin Nutter highlights Andrew Cantrell's independence 
and the breadth of knowledge required to complete this 
innovative research project. 
As an undergraduate student in mechanical engineering 
at the University of Arkansas, Mr. Andrew Cantrell was 
mvarded an Honors College Undergraduate Research 
Grant for the research described in this paper. Andrew, 
currently in the United States Navy, was a hard working and 
well disciplined student. The research required learning 
the fundamentals of aerosol dispersion, existing literature, 
building air-conditioning systems, and the modeling software 
(CONTAM) that is made available by the US. National 
Institute of Standards and Technology. Andrews research 
was completely independent and took about a year and a half 
to complete. As the advisor. I provided guidance, structure, 
and expertise for Mr. Cantrell to complete his research. The 
research topic is unique and not addressed in the available 
literature. I encouraged the publication of Andrews work. 
Finally, it should be noted that even though the presented work 
could be perceived as sensitive, it is important to publish. 
Understandings of the research findings should be used in a 
proactive way and to emphasize the importance of developing 
the necessary sensing technologies related to prevention and 
aerosol bioagent spread minimization within a building. 
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